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Following the second World War, the border between Slovenia and Croatia in the 
territory of Istria was completely drawn anew. The first division was put forth by the 
creation of the Free Territory of Trieste on the 1st of September 1947. The river 
Dragonja was chosen to represent this border. Objections to this were made by the 
inhabitants of Mini-Škrila in 1948 and the inhabitants of Bužine in 1949. The Official 
Gazette of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY), no. 43 of the year 
1953, determined the way of dividing cadastral municipalities and was followed by 
the Law on Regional and Municipal Territorialization of the People's Republic of 
Slovenia, in the Official Gazette of the PRS no. 24/55, a law which precisely 
determines the border of the Slovenian republic according to the outer borders of its 
cadastral municipalities. The surface area of Slovenia, according to this law, consists 
of 2,027,300 ha, 95 a, and 19m2. Of course, in certain areas, not just in Istria but 
elswehere as well, the inhabitants interpreted the state of the border in their own ways 
and thus de facto obtained parts of the territory which de iure belonged to the 'other' 
side. There are six of these so-called controversial areas, namely, the area around 
Hotiza, at Sekuliči by the Gorjanci mountain range, the peak of Mt. Trdin, the plot of 
land of Tomšič beneath Mt. Snežnik, the area around Dragonja, and the course of the 
border at sea. 
For clarity's sake, we will deal with the border at sea and the border on land seperately, 
even though both constitute a single, uninterrupted border. 
THE BORDER AT SEA 
Experts should, through serious professional discussion amongst each other, come up 
with serious and argumentative answers to the following (and perhaps other) 
questions: 
1. Is the statement that, during the existence of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY), there was no division between the Socialist Republics 
concerning the border at sea, that is, that all the sea belonged to all the 
Republics and Autonomous Provinces, compatible with the Constitution of the 
SFRY that was valid up until the day of collapse, that is, until the 25th June 
1991? 
2. Is it possible or likely that the Arbitration Committee set up by the European 
Union on the 27th of August 1991 (and which is popularly called 'Badinter's 
Arbitration Committee' or 'Badinter's Committee' in short) committed an error, 
or overlooked, in the 'Opinions of the Arbitration Committee', the part of the 
border between Slovenia and Croatia which is at sea (this being elaborated 
upon in the third point of the third opinion in this report) ? 
3. Is the opinion of the Arbitration Committee, which was seemingly accepted 
with approval, in full, by both the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of 
Croatia immediatelly after independence, yet now no longer seems to be, that 
is, is an opinion that was arrived upon by an EU-appointed committee, made 
up of five respected heads of supreme courts, so unclear that it can in no way 
be applied to the question of the border between the Republic of Slovenia and 
the Republic of Croatia at sea? 
Before we answer the questions asked above, two details must be taken into 
consideration. A detail that is too often overlooked is the meaning of the legal 
principle of uti possidetis, this being that the state of affairs on a certain date, 
particularly chosen, becomes a limiting factor, and if the principle is called into effect, 
all history prior to said date is 'forgotten'.  
Referring to historical arguments is in contradiction to the uti possidetis principle. 
This principle in reality does away with all historical arguments and disregards any 
nonsense and injustice done in the past, thereby preventing the rectification of these 
injustices. All that matters is the state of affairs on the chosen date. 
The other detail we must call attention to is that rarely does only one subject 
administer a certain part of a certain territory. In many places in the SFRY, there were 
no precise boundaries between administrators, and thus there are more than just a few 
cases where one socio-political community, this being one Republic or its local 
administrative unit, administered one field and another Republic administered a 
second field, all this happening in one geographic area which was part of the territory 
of only one of the two Republics. It would appear logical that such a territory is ceded 
to the Republic which managed and administered more, if not the majority, of the area 
in question. 
The answer to question a): The Constitution of the SFRY (article 5, paragraph 1): 
»The territory of the SFRY is unified, and is composed of the territories of its 
Socialist Republics.« From this it follows that there was no territory within the SFRY 
that also at the same time was not part of any of the Socialist Republics (SR). The sea 
was, like all other territory of the SFRY, unified but, according to the constitution, 
each specific point at sea belonged to one of the SRs. From the constitution, we can 
conclude which part of which territory belonged to whom. »The working people and 
citizens exercise their sovereign rights in the Socialist Republics and Socialist 
Autonomous Provinces and – when determined by this constitution to be of common 
interest – in the SFRY.« Thus it clearly follows: all sovereign rights, aside from those 
transferred to the SFRY, are exercised on the territory of each specific SR. The 
territory on which the SR of Slovenia exercised its sovereign rights, aside from those 
transferred to the SFRY, therefore belonged to Slovenia (I intentionally use the 
diction of the Constitution of the SFRY, which today sounds anachronistic). In the 
part of its territory which is at sea, the SR of Slovenia exercised police supervision, 
ecological protection, control over economic exploitation of the sea, control over 
prohibited activities regarding protected species of fauna and marine flora, control 
over archeological activities at sea, etc. 
It is undisputable that the interior of the Bay of Piran, all the way to the lines of 
shallow water at the coast of Savudrija, belonged to the SR of Slovenia, as it was she 
who carried out all of the aforementioned activites in this territory. 
The activities carried out by Slovenia as part of exercising her sovereign rights, 
however, must not be confused with the activites carried out in the name of the entire 
federation. By this we mean those activites necessary for the carrying out the 
federation's constitutional rights and which were transferred to the federation from all 
the Socialist Republics and Socialist Autonomous Provinces by the constitution (see 
article 281). These activites could have been carried out by federal agencies or the 
agencies of any republic, that is, of the republic designated to carry out the activity by 
the federation, and, therefore, can we in no way conclude from these activites whether 
Slovenia (or Croatia) exercised its power and sovereign rights. These activities are 
connected to defense, protection of international borders, control of international 
travel by sea, control of travel by air, etc.  
Often, the fact that Slovenian agencies carried out the task of controlling the state 
border is used as an argument for this area being the territory of Slovenia. The 
Slovenian argument based on the written directive of the former Yugoslav state 
regarding Slovenian Police supervision of 16 miles of the border with Italy simply 
carries no weight in determining where which SR exercised its sovereign rights, as we 
speak of carrying out federal directives and since these could have been, were the 
federation to say so, carried out by the agencies of any SR. 
The case of the tanker Nonno Ugo, which was stranded on the 8th of March 1973 on 
the coast of Savudrija, near the settlement of Kanegra, is a case from which we cannot 
conclude that Croatia exercised sovereign power over this area of the Bay of Piran. 
While it is true that all formalities with the owner of the vessel were settled by the 
Port Authority of Pula, its Umag division to be more precise, and although it is 
equally true that control of the area of the incident, information collection from 
eyewitnesses, and interrogation of the ship's crew and captain were all carried out by 
instructions from, and under control of, the then- Republic Secretariat for Maritime 
Administration, Transport, and Communications in Zagreb, the fact of the matter 
remains that the incident was a question of international travel by sea, and this was, 
according to the constitution of the SFRY, a constitutional right, that is, a right of the 
federation. Thus, the republic's agencies de facto carried out the investigation only in 
the name of the SFRY, this in no way being an exercise of the republic's sovereign 
rights. 
Often, one can encounter arguments, particularly from the side of Croatia, founded on 
supposed agreements on Croatian agencies carrying out some of the measures of 
control. Written documents confirming such agreements allegedly exist. Here 
emphasis must be placed on the fact that Slovene agencies never searched for nor 
needed any agreements with the Croatian government for operating in the area of the 
entire Bay of Piran. The fact that on the other hand, Croatia did require, and actively 
pursued, permission from Slovenia for the operations of its agencies in the Bay of 
Piran is merely evidence that only Slovenia exercised her sovereign rights in this area. 
Thus, this territory was Slovenian and from the side of Croatia de facto acknowledged 
to be Slovenian, or she would have never needed nor pursued the mentioned 
agreements. Of course, Slovenia could allow anyone to conduct any sort of operation 
or activity on its territory (if, of course, this was in accord with the legislation valid at 
the time). Even the viewpoint of prof. Vukas that »in many accidents at sea, the 
Slovenian government contacted Croatian agencies for help, that is, if the accident 
occured in the southern part of the Bay of Piran« (Vukas, 2004) simply confirms the 
fact that the southern part of the Bay of Piran was also under Slovene jurisdiction, 
since Croatian agencies came when they were called, and the entity with jurisdiction 
is the one who decides whom to call. 
It is hardly a dilemma whether there is sound basis or not for calling into effect the uti 
possidetis principle suggested by the Arbitration Committee for dealing with the 
interior of the Bay of Piran. Therefore, regarding the Bay of Piran, we do not speak of 
determining a common border but, in accordance with the opinion of the Arbitration 
Committee, of a precise determining of the border's co-ordinates along the line that 
seperates the territory in question into the area where the SR of Slovenia exercised her 
sovereign rights and the area where the SR of Croatia exercised hers. This solution 
would be bad for Slovenia, since in the best case scenario she would only have access 
to the open sea at a single point, while it would be completely unacceptable to Croatia, 
since she would attain the coast of Savudrija (up to shallow waters) without the 
Croatian sea. It would be a highly impractical and illogical solution to have a coast 
with no sea. In no way would the Croatian public accept this. Here we must add that, 
according to UNCLOS (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which 
came into effect on 16.11.1994), it is no longer possible to re-draw a border and have 
the coast belong to one state and the sea to another. But in this case, and this is a very 
important point, we do not re-draw the border; instead, we simply are trying to 
discover where the line that seperated the two territories passed. The blame for its 
impractical placement is to be shouldered by the former SFRY. Pursuing this solution 
would be for Croatia much worse than the solution offered by the »Drnovšek-Račan« 
agreement.  
The »Drnovšek-Račan« agreement, the content of which was prepared in July 2001 
and was immediately supported by the governments of both countries, was in essence 
a compromise that was based on the opinions of the Arbitration Committee. 
Regarding the border on land, it is clear that neither of the two SRs fully exercised 
their sovereign rights to the exclusion of the other in the controversial areas, so a 
common border was drawn up by mutual consent. However, regarding the border at 
sea, Slovenia would give Croatia a part of the Bay of Piran, and Croatia would in turn 
give nothing to Slovenia, instead giving up some territorial waters to international 
waters. Each side thus lost something, but gained something more important – a 
mutually agreed upon state border. Domestic political interests, however, prevented 
the agreement from ever being ratified. 
 
I do not have access to the transcripts of the sessions that hatched the last constitution 
of the SFRY, but precisely on the question of territories that would not belong to any 
of the republics, a heated debate arose. If the sea had not been divided, it would have 
belonged to the federation itself and no socialist republic would have exercised its 
sovereign rights on it nor would have the republics' police forces been in charge of 
controlling and patrolling the waters; the federation's agencies would have done this, 
that is, the Yugoslav People's Army, something that no republic that had access to sea 
would ever allow. The result of these heated debates was the famous fifth article of 
the SFRY Constitution, which in effect divided the sea and made every point at sea 
belong to one of the Socialist Republics. 
The answer to question b): There were some claims, mostly from Croatia's side, that 
the opinions of the Arbitration Committee do not apply to the border at sea, which 
seems highly unlikely. It would be exceptionally strange that opinion no. 1, which 
states that the SFRY dissolved and that Croatia and Slovenia did not secede, would be 
held in such high regard, while opinion no. 3, which speaks of borders, including the 
border at sea, would be somehow less valid.  
The answer to question c): The opinion of the Arbitration Committee is perfectly clear. 
It is as follows: »Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become 
frontiers protected by international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of 
respect for the territorial status quo and, in particular, from the principle of uti 
possidetis. Uti possidetis, though initially applied in setting decolonisation issues in 
America and Africa, is today recognized as a general principle, as stated by the 
International Court of Justice in its Judgement of the 22nd of December 1986 in the 
case between Burkina Fase and Mali.« A priority of the opinion is that the newly 
formed states can come to mutual agreements regarding their border. If there is no 
agreement, then the status quo remains and the former boundaries become borders. It 
is also clear that the way to determine the territorial status quo is the principle of uti 
possidetis (and not uti possidetis iuris as some would claim) and this obviously shows 
the way the border should be determined; divisions of territory were not formally 
specified, or at least were not legally clear, in the time of the former SFRY, and there 
was no official agreement between the two republics. This means that the territory 
remains how it was, along with the rights exercised on it. If authority over a territory 
stems from a valid agreement or a legal act, then we speak of uti possidetis iuris, yet 
if it stems only from actual authority over a territory that is not accompanied by any 
formal acts or agreements, we speak of uti possidetis de facto (Dictionaire 
Diplomatique; pp. 1045-1050). 
If appropriate legal acts, on the basis of which the Slovene police and other Slovene 
agencies had full control of all the Bay of Piran, exist, then the conclusion according 
to both principles is the same. If we discover that the sea was not divided by legal acts, 
yet that authority over the area (aside from those cases where it was transferred to the 
federation) was in fact exercised by the Slovene police and other Slovene agencies, 
then the principle of uti possidetis iuris, due to lack of legal formalities and acts, is not 
applicable; the princple of uti possidetis de facto, however, is applicable and gives a 
clear, doubt-free solution. Here we must note that some believe that the »border [at 
sea] between Slovenia and Croatia was never determined by a legal act or a print in 
the Official Gazette« (Deisinger; 2004), yet that the division of exercising sovereign 
rights was clear, which is more than a sound basis for calling into effect the uti 
possidetis de facto principle. It is a very important fact that regarding the border at sea, 
there is no contradiction between the principles of uti possidetis iuris and uti 
possidetis de facto. It is possible that one of the two is not applicable, but even then it 
does not oppose the other princple (unlike in the case of the border on land). 
We must return now to the answer to question a). The sea during the time of the 
SFRY was divided. 
On the basis of the Constitution of the SFRY it is obvious that the sea was divided 
among the SRs, and all that is needed is to carry out the process of delimitation, that is, 
to clearly identify the border point by point according to opinion no. 3 of the 
Arbitration Committee. According to this, one clearly finds the sovereignity of the 
Republic of Slovenia over the entire Bay of Piran, in accordance with the opinions of 
the Arbitration Committee. In all likelihood, the EU will support this, as it was the EU 
that appointed the Arbitration Committee and will be unwilling to admit that its 
committee either forgot about the sea, or presented an opinion that is useless. 
When speaking of the Croatian tactics of bilateral relations, the fact is that Croatian 
politics and policies, in relations with Slovenia, was always based on two points. The 
first is the strategy of fait accompli, while the other is selective carrying out of 
agreements. Croatian diplomacy and politics was always highly skilled at 
implementing bilateral agreements only partially. The best example is the partial 
implementation of SOPS (the agreement on border traffic and co-operation, which 
came into effect on the 5th September 2001). In those elements of the agreement that 
benefit Croatia and maximize gains for her, Croatia strongly and firmly implements 
bilateral agreements. As soon as it comes to elements that do not maximize at least 
short-term Croatian interests, then these elements simply are not implemented. 
In Croatia one can hear that there is little reason left for further negotiation with 
Slovenia regarding the border issue, since negotiation eventually and inevitably 
entails accepting and giving concessions. And the need for further concessions no 
longer exists. This mentality of selective implementation of agreements is very firm 
and essentially, there exists a national consent regarding it in Croatia (Gjenero; 2006). 
This model of selective implementation of agreements and the fait accompli model 
can be clearly seen in the incidents occuring at the border at Dragonja. The Joras farm 
definitively belonged to Croatia according to the »Drnovšek-Račan« agreement, 
therefore, by insisting that the farm belongs to Croatia, Croatia herself practically 
endorses the »Drnovšek-Račan« agreement, despite the fact that she would never 
accept it. On the other hand, a typical fait accompli example is the building of a 
border station on controversial territory. It has been said that this building does not 
define the border. Nonetheless, it was at this 'unprovoking border' that the incidents 
regarding Mr. Podobnik and Joras' farm occured, when he walked past the official 
border station. The previous point of a border station not defining the border was 
promptly forgotten. Therefore, after building this border station, step by step, by 
selective implementation of agreements, the border was re-drawn which on this day 
should be uncontroversial and final. 
Of course, one must ask the question of how to implement the opinions of the 
Arbitration Committee if Croatia claims that she accepts them, and yet obviously 
avoids them in the Bay of Piran. As a member of the EU and of NATO, Slovenia can 
with all seriousness demand the respecting of the Arbitration Committee's opinions 
set forth by the EU on 27.8.1991. Disregarding the opinions of the Arbitration 
Committee surely is 'not European' and therefore it is surely legitimate and in 
accordance with good diplomatic practice that Slovenia demands Croatia's acceptance 
of these opinions before she becomes a member of the EU. It seems that the only 
agreement that the two countries might agree on is the »Drnovšek-Račan« agreement. 
Very likely, neither country will be prepared to accept a worse deal, and neither 
country will be able to secure a better deal. In the case that there is no agreement, then 
it is appropriate to turn to the Arbitration Committee in accordance with the written 
promise from the letter from the 19th December 1991 (Kunič; 2007). 
At this point, it is important to add that the opinion put out by the Arbitration 
Committee was composed from exceptionally well-regarded personalities, led by the 
esteemed Robert Badinter, and was politically supported by the EU; full compliance 
and respect of the opinion was, in fact, one of the conditions for recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia. 
The question of the border at sea between Slovenia and Croatia should be, and in my 
opinion has to be, settled by an impartial international institution, which above all 
should respect the undisputed fact that the sea in the times of the SFRY was divided 
amongst the then-Socialist Republics, and recognize the opinions of Badinter's 
Arbitration Committee. 
THE BORDER ON LAND 
Just as with the border at sea, the solution described in opinion no. 3 of the Arbitration 
Committee was accepted as a solution for the border on land. 
Until a final agreement about the border is reached, neither Croatian nor Slovenian 
institutions should, with any action, in particular not with official action, claim or 
behave as if the border is clear and by doing so preclude the conclusions of a possible 
mutual agreement or the solutions proposed by appropriate institutions. Yet it often 
came to this in the Bay of Piran and on the left bank of the Mura river at Hotiza. 
Despite the presence of Slovene police forces, Croatian workers were working on 
land that, according to the principle of uti possidetis (referring to the state of affairs on 
25.6.1991), most likely belongs to Slovenia, since only Slovenia de facto controlled 
this area and de facto had possession of it. The appropriate institutions did not react 
when a bridge over the Mura river was built and added upon in the controversial area. 
What is even less acceptable is the fact that representatives from both countries 
agreed that the floodbank on the left bank of the river should be repaired by workers 
from both countries; by this, the Slovene representatives again, in a way, gave support 
to the idea that the territory is not undisputably Slovene. 
The issue of a mutually agreed upon state border between Slovenia and Croatia is of 
key importance for both states involved, but it can only be solved by an external, 
impartial institution. It is an issue that has been intensely abused for domestic policy 
gains, and any statements or actions other than non-professional, political populist 
opinions for what belongs to whom can only occur in the case that the governments of 
both countries are strong and are not facing elections just around the corner. That 
things will ever reach this situation is, however, very unlikely. But a final settlement 
regarding the issue will be very positive for both sides involved, as it will remove a 
difficult and problematic burden from the daily schedule. Any and every moment 
spent on waiting for a solution to pop up is in direct opposition to both Croatia's and 
Slovenia's national interest. 
The excuse that when both countries will be EU members, borders will cease to exist, 
simply does not add up. Dreaming about the EU solving border questions is highly 
unrealistic. This is the direct consequence of not being familiar with the issues that 
long-term members of the EU share. The EU does not solve such questions, and has 
no intention of doing so either, which was confirmed last year by the European 
Commissioner for Enlargement Rehn. These are, after all, questions of a bilateral 
nature. It is true, however, that the EU would like as little of such questions to be left 
unsolved. 
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